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Abstract 
In this paper we study (i) the frame-theory of certain bimodal provability logics involving the 
reflection principle and we study (ii) certain specific bimodal logics with a provability predicate 
for a subtheory of Peano arithmetic axiomatized by a non-standardly finite number of axioms. 
1. Introduction 
The aim of the present paper is twofold. We study the general question how to make 
models and frames for bimodal provability logics with reflection without invoking 
syntactical conditions. The solution is roughly: add a sufficient amount of o-tails to 
the more usual models. Our models and frames enable us to give a Solovay style 
arithmetical completeness theorem, the form of the construction of an embedding of 
algebras. Secondly we study certain logics for subsystems of Peano arithmetic (PA) 
whose axiom sets are bounded by non-standard numbers. The arithmetical complete- 
ness theorem for these systems can be applied to characterize which formulas of the 
language of ordinary, ‘unimodal’, provability logic are C1 (modulo PA-provable 
equivalence) under all arithmetical interpretations (where the q is interpreted as 
provability in PA). 
Why go bimodal? Why study the logic of the provability predicate of a system in 
combination with the provability predicate of a familiar system like PA as opposed to 
simply studying the logic of the new provability predicate alone? One possible answer 
is: because there is a ‘coupling’ effect between the ‘new’ predicate and the familiar one. 
The familiar predicate functions as an auxiliary to prove and express facts about the 
‘new’ predicate. For an elaboration of this theme, see [6, Ch. 43. This answer will not 
do however for the systems studied in this paper: in each case there is provably 
a complete decoupling between the predicates considered. In fact the logic of the ‘new’ 
predicate, taken alone, is in each case Lob’s logic L. Our answer should rather be 
(i) that only in combination with the familiar predicate do the specific properties of the 
new one become visible at all and (ii) that in some cases results about the bimodal 
system can be applied to the traditional ‘unimodal’ system (see Section 8). 
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1.1. Remark. After the preprint on which the present paper is based appeared in May 
1987, some of its results have been improved. This holds especially for the results of 
Section 8. We refer the reader to [l, 23. See also the comments in Section 8. We would 
like to mention that as a prerequisite knowledge of Smorynski [6] should be amply 
sufficient. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some notations and simple or 
known facts are introduced. Section 3 describes the modal systems studied in this 
paper. Section 4 gives the arithmetical interpretations that motivate the study of these 
systems. Section 5 is an extensive treatment of the Kripke model semantics of the 
systems under consideration. Section 6 studies the closed fragment of one of these 
systems. In Section 7 I prove arithmetical completeness of the systems and Section 8 
contains an application of these completeness results. I give a characterization of the 
formulas of the usual modal language for provability logic that are Z1 (modulo 
PA-provable equivalence) under all arithmetical interpretations (where the q is 
interpreted as provability in PA). 
2. Conventions, notions and elementary facts 
In this paper we restrict our attention (mainly) to RE theories T extending PA in 
the language of PA. This restriction is not at all essential, many results go through for 
RE theories T into which PRA can be interpreted. For certain results we use that the 
theories considered are essentially reflexive. These results evidently cannot be claimed 
for e.g. PRA. 
2.1. Terms. We will employ ‘terms’ for any definable function that is provably total in 
PA. For our purposes we may remain neutral as to whether these ‘terms’ are really in 
the language or just function as abbreviations. It is convenient o make a terminologi- 
cal distinction between ‘terms’ for provably recursive functions and others. If we have 
a ‘term’ for a provably recursive function we will simply call it a term, otherwise we 
will speak of a semiterm. 
2.2. Formulas. At certain points in this paper the precise form of formulas will be 
relevant, so we need some slightly idiosyncratic conventions. A formula A of the 
language of PA is do if all quantifiers of A are bounded (i.e. bounded by terms, where 
the variable of quantification does not occur in the bounding term). A formula A is C if 
it is of the form 3x1 . . . 3 xnAo, where A0 E do. A formula A is LI if it is of the form 
VX 1 . . . Vx,A,, where A0 E do. A formula A is Al if it is provably equivalent in PA 
both to a C- and to a U-formula. A formula A is Ci if it is of the form 3x&(x), where 
A,, E Al. (It is essential that we have one existential quantifier here!) Clearly the 
difference between C and C, disappears modulo provable equivalence in PA. 
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2.3. Provability. Let Proof,(x, y) be the Al-arithmetical formula representing the 
relation, x is the Godelnumber of a T-proof of the formula with Godelnumber y. We 
assume that every theory comes equipped with a A,-formula ~1~ representing the set of 
(non-predicate-logical) axioms. So identity of theories is not identity of the sets of 
theorems. Proof, will be constructed in some standard way from c(r. If we want to 
stress that we are looking at the Proof-relation based at a certain specific formula /? we 
write Proofs. We assume, for convenience, that PAt-Vx3 !y Proofr(x, y). Let 
Provr(y) := 3 x Proofr(x, y). We write par abus de langage ‘Proofr(x, A(xi, . . . ,x,)) 
for ProofT(x, ‘A(S(, , . . . ,5(,)1), here all free variables of A are among those shown, 
and ‘A@, , . . . , 5(,)1 is the ‘Godelterm’ for A(xi, . . . ,x,) as defined in [6, p. 433. 
‘nrA(x1, . . . . x,)) or ‘ATA(xl, . . . . XJ will stand for Prov,(‘A(X,, . . . ,A”)-‘). The 
choice whether to use q or A will depend on extra-arithmetical considerations, 
namely the relative roles the provabilities will be playing (via the arithmetical 
interpretation) in the modal system we are studying. 
If t is a term (by our convention, for a provably recursive function) we will have 
(supposing that t is substitutable for x in A) PAt-(nTA(x))[t/x] ++ q TA(t). So as far as 
substitution of terms is concerned we may indeed treat xi, . . . ,x, in q ]rA(xi , . . . , x,) 
as free variables. Occurrences of semiterms within ‘modal’ contexts should always be 
read with the smallest possible scope. Similarly for AT. ‘oT’ will stand for 1 ori, and 
‘VT’ for 1 A,i. 
2.4. or 1 x and q T*. Suppose T is given by a. Define 
at-Q):-a(y)Ay<x, UT t XA :* q ,,J, 
Of course PAt-urA CI q T* A, but the difference in form will be of some importance 
when Rosser-orderings come into play. (The usefulness of or* in this connection was 
discovered by Svejdar [S].) 
2.5. Witnessing and the Rosser-ordering. Let A be of the form 3x&(x). Define, for 
terms t: t wit A :o A,(t). Here we assume that bound variables in A0 are renamed-if 
necessary - to make t substitutable for x in &. 
Let A be of the form 3x A,(x) and B of the form 3x B,(x). The witness comparisons 
between A and B are defined as follows: 
A < B:o ~x(A,(x)r\Vy < x-~B,(y)), A < B:o 3x(Ao(x)nVy < xlB,(y)). 
We will always apply witnessing and the Rosser-ordering to the precise forms in which 
the relevant arithmetical formulas are introduced. 
In connection with the NB-systems we will consider formulas of the form 
q pA*C < S, where S is a Ci-sentence. It is easily seen that q pA*C < S is itself Ci. (This 
depends crucially on the fact that S consists of just one existential quantifier followed 
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by a Al-formula!) On the other hand S ,< OpA *C need not even be provably equiva- 
lent to a C,-sentence. (S < q pA*C happens to be AZ.) 
3. The modal systems 
For the record I first describe the usual Lob’s logic L. Let !i?e be the language of 
modal propositional logic. The truthfunctional connectives are: I, A, v,l, --+,w. 
The modal operator is 0. Lob’s logic L is given as the minimal set of &formulas 
containing the following axioms and closed under the following rules: 
(LO) All tautologies of propositional logic 
(Ll) t-•(~-rII/)+(o~+o~) 
(L2) ~o~-oo~ 
(L3) t- q (o& + 49 + 04 
(L4) k 4 and k(4 + II/) * F+ 
(L5) l-@*t-o4 
We turn to the bimodal systems that are the subject of this paper. Let 2 
be the language of bimodal propositional logic. 9 is the result of adding the modal 
operator A to tic,. The logic CSMo (named after Carlson, Smorynski, Montagna) is 
given as the minimal set of Q-formulas containing the following axioms and closed 
under: 
(Al) 
642) 
(A3) 
(A4) 
(A5) 
(A6) 
(Rl) 
(R2) 
Some theorems of CSMo are: 
The logic CSM, is given as the minimal set of f?-formulas closed under (Rl), (R2) 
and containing (Al)-(A6), plus 
(A7) t- q (N) + 4) 
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The logic CSM2 is given as the minimal set of f!-formulas closed under (Rl) and 
containing the following axioms: 
(A8) All theorems of CSMr 
(A9) k@+4 
The logic CSM3 is given as the minimal set of &formulas closed under (Rl) and 
containing (AS) and 
Clearly (A9) is derived in CSM3. 
The logic NBr is given as the minimal set of !&formulas closed under (Rl), (R2) and 
containing (Al)-(A6), plus 
Finally the logic NB2 is the minimal set of Q-formulas closed under (Rl) and 
containing (AlO), plus 
(A12) All theorems of NBr 
(A13) k 04 -+ A4 
CSMe is PRLl of Smorynski [6] and F- of Montagna [S]. CSMr is PRLzF of 
Smorynski [6] and F of Montagna [S]. CSMz is PRLzF + Reflection, of Smorynski 
[6] (Smorynski writes ‘Reflection q ‘,but his q is my A, and his A my q ) and it is F1 of 
Montagna [S]. CSM3 is PRLzF + Reflection, of Smoryhski [6]. The NB-systems are 
new on the scene. NB stands for non-standardly bounded. It is easily seen that each of 
the CSM and NB systems extends L. 
4. Arithmetical interpretations 
An interpretationfunctionfis a function from the propositional variables of L! to the 
sentences of the language of PA. 
4.1. Interpretations for the GSA4 theories 
Let T and U be RE extensions of PA in the language of PA. We will write ‘AT’ for 
provability in T, ‘0” for provability in U. We assume that U-AT,4 + A, 
for all sentences A of the language of arithmetic. (The restriction to the language 
of PA is not at all essential here, all results of this section could be stated for 
RE T and U such that PRA can be interpreted in T (say via ( . )+), T can be interpreted 
in U (say via (.)*) and Uk((A.A)+)* -(A)* for all sentences A in the language 
of T.) 
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4.1.1. Definition. Letfbe an interpretation function. We define ( . ) (f, U, T) from L! to 
the sentences of the language of PA as follows: 
. (p)(f, U, T):=fp, 
l ( .)(f, U, T) commutes with the propositional ogical constants, 
. (@)(f, U, T):= o&$)(1; U, T), 
. (@)(f, U, T):= &(@(f, U, T). 
4.1.2. Soundness for the CSM systems. 
CSMI~~ * T W)LL U, T 1. 
CSMH * U WN(f; U, T), 
suppose U is true, then CSM3t-4 = N\(4)(f, U, T). 
4.2. Interpretations for the NB theories 
Let FC be the set of false Z,-sentences. Let S E FZ. Say S = 3x SOx, where So E A 1. 
Define APA,sA := q pA*A < S. Clearly dPA+l E C1. 
We note some equivalents of flPA,s A. Suppose p is the Giidelnumber of a PA-proof 
X. Let ep be the supremum of the Giidelnumbers of the arithmetical axioms occurring 
in z. If p is not a Giidelnumber of a PA-proof, let /p be 0. We make the reasonable 
assumption that the Gijdelnumbers of formulas occurring in a proof n are smaller 
then the Giidelnumber p of 7~. Hence for p # 0, dp < p. We have 
PAE&,,sA c+ 3 y (ProofpA(y, A) A t/z < dyi &z). 
Suppose zx is the Al-formula associated with PA. Define 
7rlpS(y):= 7cyhvz < y1sfJz. 
We have PAt-APA,s A c* &lsA. 
4.2.1. Definition. Let f be an interpretation function. We define (.)(f; PA, S) from 
L! to the sentences of the language of PA as follows: 
. (p)(f, PA, S):= fp, 
l (.)(f, PA, S) commutes with the propositional logical constants, 
. (o&(f, PA, S):= q PA($)(~, PA, S), 
. (@)(f, PA, S):= APA.s(@(~, PA, S). 
4.2.2. Soundness for NB1. NB1 F4 3 for S E FZ andfor allf, PA!-(4)(f, PA, S). 
Proof. One shows that {rj E f? 1 PAI-(4)(f, PA, S)} contains the axioms of NB1 and is 
closed under the rules of NB1. Most of this is routine. Closure under (R2) essentially 
uses the falsity of S. We check (All). Suppose S E FC. It is clearly sufficient o show 
PA~(~APA,sA A q PAA) -+ q PA(APA,SB --t B). 
A. Visser / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 73 (1995) 109-142 115 
Reason in PA. suppose 1 APA,S A and q PAA. It clearly follows that S < q pA*A, and 
hence that S. Let u be the smallest witness of S. Clearly •~A(A~~,~B - UPA IdI). Hence 
(by the essential reflexiveness of PA) q PA(APA,SB + B). 0 
Note that we cannot go from S < npA*A to q PA(S d q PA*A), S d q IPA*A not being 
in general provably equivalent o a Z,-sentence. If we could, the principle 
t-(lA4~04)+A(lA4~ud4 
would be valid, but it is not, the arithmetical completeness theorem for NB1 provides 
a counterexample (see Section 7). 
4.2.3. Soundness for NB2. NB2t-4 = for all SE FE andfor aIlf, Nk($)(f, PA, S). 
5. Kripke semantics 
Our aim in this section is to provide a ‘tail’ Kripke semantics for the CSM- and 
NB-systems. Our models have two advantages: (i) they do not require syntactical 
restrictions in their description and (ii) they allow the Solovay style completeness 
theorems to take the form of the construction of an embedding of algebras. A price we 
have to pay is that our models cannot be finite anymore. In fact - as will be explained 
in due course - compactness will take the place of finiteness, which implies that 
‘propositions’ can be specified in a direct and simple way. Compactness guarantees 
that the sentences used in the arihmetical embeddings have a simple form. Certain 
natural models like the Henkin model of the closed fragments of the theory under 
consideration are in the relevant class of models used in both the Kripke-model and 
the arithmetical completeness theorem for that theory. 
The main problem we are facing is how to deal with the reflection principle in 
irreflexive Kripke-style frames. The constraint we want to put on solutions is that the 
nodes satisfying the reflection principle should be precisely the nodes satisfying some 
simple condition that is given in terms of structure. Our solution is to have our frames 
equipped with a certain topology. The nodes satisfying the reflection principle will be 
precisely the limit points in the sense of this topology. First we introduce frames. 
5.1. Definition. A preframe if is a structure (K, R, S), where: 
(i) K is a non-empty set. 
(ii) R and S are binary, irreflexive relations on K. 
(iii) R c S. 
(iv) R and S are transitive, and xSyRz * xRz. 
R is the accessibility relation for the q ; S is the accessibility relation for A. Par abus 
de langage we will ascribe relational properties to 5 while intending to convey that 
S satisfies these properties, e.g. we say ‘5 is upwards wellfounded’ meaning that S is 
upwards wellfounded. 
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5.2. Some notations. xWSy :e xSy or x = y; xWRy :e xRy or x = y; xS:= 
{ye KlxSy}; Sx:= {YE KlySx}. 
5.3. Definition. (i) Consider a preframe i’j = (K, S, R). Define a topology a, by 
taking the sets of the form x WS and Sx as subbasis. 
(ii) 3 is aframe if 5 is treelike, i.e. XSZ and ySz * xWSy or ySx, and the sets xR 
are open in aa. The clopens of a, are the propositions of the frame 5. 
At this point we give some information about the topology 9,. A.o. we characterize 
what it is for a frame to be compact. Compactness is important for us because the 
models we are going to embed into arithmetic will be compact models. The crucial 
consequence of compactness i that the clopens are finite unions of finite intersections 
of the elements of our subbasis. 
5.4. Fact. Let 5 be a frame, then: 
(i) x WS, Sx and Rx are clopen. 
(ii) a, is HausdorfJ: 
(iii) If K is jnite, then a, is discrete. 
5.5. Definition. Let 5 = (K, R, S) be a frame. Consider a subset X of K. x in K is 
a limit ofX if for all opens Y in a, with x E Y there is a y in K such that y # x and 
y E Y nX. We say that x is a limit if x is a limit of K. 
5.6. Fact. Let 5 = (K, R, S) be a frame and let X E K. x is a limit of X ifSfor some u, 
xSu and for every u, o with xSu and xSv there is a z E X such that xSz, ZSU and ZSV. 
5.7. Definition. Let i’j = (K, R, S) be a frame. u is an antidirect successor of x if XSU 
and xSn WSu does not have a minimum. 
5.8. Theorem. Let 5 = (K, R, S) be a frame. 3 is compact i@ 
(i) For every x there is an S-minimal y with y WSx. 
(ii) S is upwards wellfounded. 
(iii) Every S-antichain is finite. 
(iv) Zf x has an antidirect successor, then x is a limit. 
Proof. Consider a frame 3. z-: Suppose 5 is compact. 
(i) Consider Y := {u WS ) u E K}. Clearly Y is an open cover of K. Consider a finite 
subcover Y,,. Let y be S-minimal such that x E yWS E Y,. It is easily seen that y is 
S-minimal in K. 
(ii) Suppose S is not upwards wellfounded. There is an ascending sequence 
XlSXZSXJ . . . Consider Y := {Sx, I n E CO} u {zWS I for no n, zSx,}. It is easily seen that 
Y is an open cover of K that has no finite subcover. 
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(iii) Suppose there is an infinite S-antichain. Then by Zorn’s lemma there is 
a maximal infinite S-antichain, say X. Consider Y := {x WS 1 x E X} u {Sx 1 x E X}. It 
is easily seen that Y is an open cover of K that has no finite subcover. 
(iv) Consider an x with antidirect successor y. Suppose x is not a limit. Clearly {x} 
is open. Let Y := { WSx} u {uWS 1 not uWSX}. Clearly Y is an open cover of K. If 
Y had a finite subcover, xSn WSy would be covered by a finite number of sets 
u0 WS, . , uk WS for ui with xSui WSy. Clearly the Ui are linearly ordered by S, so there 
is a minimum Uj. It follows that UjWS covers xSn WSy, and hence that Uj is the 
minimum of xSn WSy. 
c=: Suppose 5 satisfies (i)-(iv). By (i) the set of S-minimal elements is non-empty, 
by (iii) it is finite. So without loss of generality we may assume that 3 has a bottom b. 
Let ‘1) be an open cover of K. To find a finite subcover we construct a finitely 
branching tree as follows: the nodes of the tree will be of the form (x, 0) where 
x E 0 E ‘2). Moreover if (y, 0’) lies above (x, 0) in the tree, then xSy. The 0 such that 
(x, 0) is in the tree will form a finite open subcover. 
As bottom of the tree take (b, O,), where O0 is some element of ‘2) containing b. 
Suppose (x, 0) is a node we already created. We choose its direct successors as 
follows. Let X := {y E xWS 1 x WSnSy G 0, y$ O}. The elements of X are pairwise 
incomparable, hence X is finite. For each y E X pick some 0’ E ‘I) such that y E 0’ and 
take (y, 0’) as immediate successor of (x, 0) in the tree. 
Our tree is finitely branching. Moreover if (y, 0’) lies above (x, 0) we have xSy, 
hence by the upwards wellfoundedness of S the tree has no infinite paths. Thus by 
Konig’s lemma the tree is finite. 
Let ‘2)() := (0 I (x, 0) is in the tree}. We claim U ‘& = K. Suppose z is not in UgO. 
Let Z:= {x I for some 0, (x, 0) is in the tree}. Clearly for some x (e.g. b), XSZ and 
x E Z. Pick x maximal such that XSZ and x E Z. Consider the node (x, 0) in the tree. 
Let y be maximal such that x WSySz and xWSn WSy E 0. Suppose y is a limit. 
Clearly, for some xi, . . . ,xk,y E yWSnSxl n ... nSx,nSz E 0, hence there is a y’ 
with y’ # y and 
y’~yWSnSx,n...nSx,nSz E 0. 
It follows that y WSn WSy’ G 0 and thus that 
xWSn WSy’ = (xWSn WSy)u(yWSn WSy’) c 0. 
Moreover xWSy’Sz. But ySy’, contradicting the maximality of y. We may conclude 
that y is not a limit. By (iv) yS n WSz has a minimum, say, u. If u were in 0, then u # z, 
hence x WSuSz and xWSn WSu = (x WSn WSy)u {u} z 0, contradicting the maxi- 
mality of y. So u # 0. Clearly x WS n Su = x WS n WSy E 0. By the construction of 
the tree u will be in Z and thus u # z and uSz, contradicting the maximality of x. Thus 
we find that ‘?JO is a finite open cover. 0 
We turn to models. 
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5.9. Definition. Consider a preframe 5 = (K, R, S). 
(i) We define the following operations on P(K): I := 8, 1X:= Xc, XA Y:= 
XnY, XvY:=XuY, X-+Y:=1XvY, XoY:=(X+Y)r\(Y-+X), 
AX:=(XEK~XS~X},~X:={XEK~XR~X}. 
(ii) A preassignmentf on 5 is a function from the propositional atoms po, pl, p2, . . . 
to the subsets of K. We define the interpretation. 1.4 from our bimodal language and 
preassignments o subsets of K as follows: [pi]] f:=fpi, 1. ] f ‘commutes’ with the 
logical constants, i.e. 14 A rjJf= [f$]f~ [II/If; etc. If f is a preassignment on a pre- 
frame 5, we say that 6 := (3, f) is a premodel. Define 
x 114(f) :O x E w 
(iii) Suppose 5 is a frame. A preassignment f on i’j is an assignment on 5 if fpi is 
clopen for all i. 
(iv) A premodel 8 = (3, f ) is a model if 5 is a frame and f is an assignment. 
(v) On frames we define 
x It 4 :o for all assignments f on 5; x k+(f), 
i’j 114 :o for all x in K; x It 4. 
5.10. Fact. Let 5 be a frame. The propositions are closed under _L,-I, A, v, + ,t), A 
and q I. And thus [I$]f is clopen for any assignment f on 5. 
Proof. We treat the cases of A and 0. Let X be any subset of K. We show that AX and 
0X are clopen. 
Suppose x E AX. Consider y with xSy. If ySz, then XSZ and hence z E X. It follows 
that y E AX. Ergo x E xWS c AX. 
Suppose x $ AX. For some y, xSy and y .$ X. Clearly x E Sy. Moreover if zSy, then 
z$ AX. Ergo x E Sy E (AX)‘. 
Suppose x E OX. Consider y with xSy. If yRz then xSyRz, hence xRz and thus 
z E X. It follows that y E OX. Ergo x E xWS G q X. 
Suppose x # OX. For some y, xRy and y $ X. Clearly x E Ry. Moreover if zRy, then 
z$ OX. Ergo x E Ry c (OX)‘. q 
5.11. Theorem. Let iJ be a frame. 3 It A(Ap + p) + Ap ifs S is upwards wellfounded. 
Proof. s=: Entirely routine. 
=x Let X := {x) xWS is upwards wellfounded w.r.t. S}. It is easily seen that X is 
clopen. Set fp := X. Clearly every x in K forces A(Ap + p) under f but any x not in the 
upwards wellfounded part would not force Ap under 5 q 
5.12. Theorem. Let $J be a frame, x E K. We have 
(i) x It Ap + p o x is a limit point. 
(ii) x Ik up -+ p o x is a limit point of xR. 
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Proof. (i) =>: Suppose x IF dp + p. If x were not a limit point, {x} would be open and 
hence clopen (because our topology is Hausdorff). Thus {x}’ would be clopen. Clearly 
x E A(x)’ and x4 {x}‘. To arrive at a contradiction set fp:= {x}‘. 
*: Suppose x is a limit point, X is clopen and x E AX. For a reductio assume x$X. 
We have x E x WSnX’ and xWSnX’ is open. x is a limit point, so there is a y with 
xSy and y $ X. Ergo x $ AX, contradiction. 
(ii) a: Suppose x It q JJ + p, suppose for a reductio that x is not a limit point of xR. 
Then there is an open X such that x E X and XnxR # 0. Clearly for certain 
y,, . . . . y,, x EZ:= xWSnSy,n . ..nSy. c X. Z is clopen by 5.4(i). If xRx’, then 
x’$Z. Hence x E q Z’, but x$ q Z’. To arrive at a contradiction put fp:= Z’. 
t: Suppose x is a limit point of xR, X is clopen and x E q X. Suppose for 
a reductio x$X. We have x E Xc and Xc is open. x is a limit point of xR so there is 
a y with xRy and y$X. Contradiction. 0 
We present he frames needed for our treatment of the various logics. It is pleasant 
to present these frames in the kind of format discovered by Timothy Carlson. 
5.13. Definition. (i) A set-preframe 3 is a structure (K, KO, K1, S), here K is a non- 
empty set; KO E K1 E K; S is transitive and treenke; x E K1 and xSy * y E K1. 
Define xRy :o xSy and (x$K, or y E K,). It is easily verified that (K, R, S) is 
a preframe. If K = K1 we speak of a Carlson-preframe. We will write (K, KO, S) for 
<K, &, K, S>. 
(ii) A set-preframe 3 is a set-frame if K1 is closed (and hence clopen) in the topology 
generated by the xWS and the Sx. It is easily seen that a set-frame can be viewed as 
a frame, defining R as in (i). 
K1 is the Kripke model counterpart of the Cl-sentence S in the arithmetical 
interpretation of the NB systems. The fact that S is Ci is reflected by the fact that K1 is 
upwards closed. The fact that K1 corresponds to an arithmetical sentence is shown by 
K,‘s clopenness. 
If K = K1 we speak of a Carlson-frame. Carlson-frames are frames for Carlson- 
models as introduced in [6, p. 1961. Note that Carlson-frames have the property xSz, 
yRz * xRz. Conversely every frame with this property can be presented as a Carl- 
son-frame by taking K,,:= range R. 
(iii) A Carlson-l-frame is a Carlson-frame, in which every x in KO is a limit point. 
(iv) A Carlson-3-frame is a Carlson-l-frame with bottom b which is a limit point 
of K,,. 
(v) A set-l-frame is a set-frame in which every element of KO is a limit point. 
(vi) A set-2-frame is a set-l-frame with bottom b, which is not in K1 and which is 
a limit point. (The fact that b$K1 reflects the falsity of the L?r-sentence S in the 
interpretation of the NB systems.) 
Set-premodels, et-models etc. are defined in the obvious way. 
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5.14. Little fact. Suppose 5 is a Carlson-frame. Then x is a limit point of xR ifsx is 
a limit point of KO. Consequently x Ik up + p ifsx is a limit point of &. 
5.15. Soundness theorem. 
(i) CSM&-4 * for all upwards welljounded frames 3, 3 IF 4, 
(ii) CSMl k$ * for all upwards wellfounded Carlson-l-frames 3, 5 It 4, 
(iii) CSMzk4 * for all upwards wellfounded Carlson-l-frames 5 = (K, KO, S), for 
all x in KO, x It f$, 
(iv) CSM3k4 * for all upwards wellfounded Carlson-3-frames 5 with bottom b, 
b It 4, 
(v) NB1!-4 * for all upwards wellfounded set-l-frames 5, iJj Il- 4, 
(vi) NB2t4 * for all upwards wellfounded set-2-frames i-j with bottom b, b It 4. 
Proof. Mostly routine using 5.11 and 5.12. We sample two cases. First we show that 
(All) is valid on upwards wellfounded set-l-frames. Suppose 5 is a upwards well- 
founded set-l-frame and let f be an assignment on 3. Suppose x It1 Ac$ A q & f). 
Clearly XS # xR and thus x E Ki. Consider y with xRy. y is in KO by the definition of 
R, hence y is a limit point. It follows that x IF q (Arl/ +$)(f). 
Secondly we show that (A13) is forced at the bottom b of a set-Zframe. Suppose 5 is 
a set-2-frame with bottom b. Let f be an assignment on 5. Suppose b k&(f). 
Suppose bSy. b+! K1, hence by the definition of R, bRy and thus y I@( f ). We may 
conclude b ItA$( f ). 0 
Of course we want to reverse the arrows of 5.15. To arrive at the desired complete- 
ness theorems we need two procedures to transform premodels into set-premodels, 
two procedures to add certain limit points to set-models and the Henkin construction 
for CSM,,. 
5.16. Definition and Fact. We define two procedures to transform premodels into 
set-premodels. Let 5 = (K, R, S) be a preframe and let f be a preassignment on 5. 
@:= (S,f >. 
(i) First we transform 8 into a Carlson-premodel. Define XG:= 6’ = (g,f’), 
where 5’ = (K’, Kb, S’), as follows: 
l K’:= {(x1,x*, . . . . x,)(xlSxzS . ..Sx.,, n = 1,2, . ..}. 
l Kb:= (x1,x2, . ..A.Y~W~,RY}, 
. CR,&, ... ~xn)s’(yl~yZ~ ...,yk) :on<kandq=y,fori=l,...,n. 
The resulting structure is clearly treelike and irreflexive. Define 
f’Pi:= {(x17xZ~ . . ..X”)EK’Ix.Efpi}. 
Claim. (x1,x2, . . . . x,)k4(f’) 0 x.11$(f). 
Proof. By induction on 4, The cases of the propositional atoms and the truth- 
functional connectives are trivial. Suppose 4 = A$. Suppose moreover 
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(Xl,%, . . . . x,) It dll/(f’) and x,Sy. Clearly (x1,x*, . . . ,x,)S’(x1,x2, . . . ,x,,y), so 
(x1rx2, . . . ,x,, y) It $(f’). Hence by the induction hypothesis y It $0. Conversely 
suppose 
x,)t@(f) and (x1,x2, . . ..x.)S’(~i,y~, . . ..yk). 
By the transitivity of S clearly x,Sy,, hence yk Ik $0 and so by the induction 
hypothesis (yl,y2, . . . ,yk) It- Il/(f’). 
The case that 4 = q + is analogous. 0 
(ii) We transform 8 into a set-model. Consider a set of formulas r that is closed 
under subformulas and such that q p E r * dp E r. Define A(%, r):= 
6’ = (g’, f’), where 3’ = (K’, Kb, K;, S’) and 
l K’:= {(x1,x2, . . . . x,)lxISx2S . ..Sx., n = 1,2, . ..}. 
l K; := {(x1,x2, . . . ,x,) E K’ 1 for some i < n and q $ E r, xi It nil/ and xi IV Al//}. 
l K;:= {(x1,x2, . . ..x.,y> E R’I (x1,x2, . . . . x”)EK; andx,Ry}. 
l (x1,x2, . . . ,x,)S’(y,,y2, . . . ,yk) :O n < k and xi = yi for i = 1, . . . ,IZ. 
Clearly S’ is transitive, treelike and irreflexive. Moreover Kb c K; E K’ and x E K; 
and xS’y 3 YE K;. 
Definef’pi:= {(x1,x2, . . . ,x.) E K’ 1 X, EfPi}. 
Claim. For all 4 E r, (x1 ,x2, .. ,x,) It f$(f’) 0 x, It 4(f). 
Proof. By induction on 4 in r. The cases of the propositional atoms and the 
truthfunctional connectives are trivial. The case of A is an in (i). 
Suppose 4 = IJ$. And suppose (x1,x2, . . . ,x,) It q $(f’) and x,Ry. Clearly if 
(x1,x2, “. 3 x,)$K, then (x1,x2, . . ..x.)R’(x1,x2, . . ..x.,y); if (x1,x2, . . ..x.) E 
G, then <x1,x2, . . . ,x,,y) E Kb and hence (x1,x2, . . . . x,,)R’(x1,x2, . . . ,x,,y); We 
may conclude (x1, x2, . . . ,x,, y) It t&f’). Hence by the induction hypothesis y IF $(f). 
Suppose x, It q t&f) and suppose (x1, x2, . . . ,x,)R’(y,,y,, . . . ,yk). In case 
(x1,x2, . . . ,x,) $K; it follows that x, It At&f) and hence yk II t+b(f). In case 
(x1,x2, ... ,x,) E K; we have x,Ry, and thus yk It- $(f). In both cases yk Ii- $(f) and 
so by the induction hypothesis ( y, , y,, . . . ) yk) It $( f’). 0 
5.17. Definition. We define a transformation Qs of set-frames. Qs has the effect of 
‘expanding’ the elements of K. in such a way that the downmost element of the 
expansion (which will be in the new K,,) is a limit point. Suppose 3 is a set-frame. 
@Sk := 8, where 5’ = (K’, Kb, K;, S’), with 
K’:={(x,i)l(x~K~ and icco) or (x$K, and i =O)}, 
K; := {(x, 0) E K’ ) x E K,}, 
K’, := {(x, i) E K’lx E K,), 
i < j :o (i = 0 and j # 0) or (i # 0 and j < i) ( < is the usual ordering of o), 
(x, i)S’(y,j) :o xSy or (x = y and i < j). 
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We define two functions F and G, respectively, from K to K’ and from K’ to K by 
Fx:= (x, 0) if x#KO, Fx:= (x, 1) if x E K,,, G(x, i) := x. 
5.18. Fact. Under the conditions of 5.17, (i) 5’ . 1s a set frame and (ii) F and G are 
continuous. 
Proof. (i) The first four conditions of the definition of set-frame are easily verified. 
The satisfaction of the fifth immediately follows from the continuity of G, seeing that 
K; = G-‘K1. 
(ii) It is sufficient o observe 
F-‘(x, i) WS’ = xWS, F-‘S’(x, i) = Sx, 
G- ‘xWS = (x, 0) WS’, G- ‘Sx = S/(x, 0). 0 
5.19. Fact. Under the conditions of 5.17, 
(i) (x, i) is a limit point in 5’ o (x, i) E Kb or (x, i) = Fx and x is a limit point of 
3 and 
(ii) (x, i) is a limit point of (x, i)R’ * (x, i) = Fx and x is a limit point of xR. 
Proof. (i) =X Suppose (x, i) is a limit point. If (x, i) E Kb we are done. So suppose 
x 4 Kb. Clearly if i = 2,3, . . . , (x, i) is not a limit. Hence i is 0 or 1. Ergo (x, i) = Fx. 
Suppose x E 0. Then (x, i) E G-‘On (x, i) WS’. It follows that there is an (y,j) with 
(y,j) E G-‘On(x, i) WS’ and (y, j) # (x, i). Clearly (x, i)S’(y, j), hence because 
(x, i) = Fx, y # x. Moreover y E 0. 
+ The simple verification is left to the reader. 
(ii) =X Suppose (x, i) is a limit point of (x, i)R’. Suppose (x, i) # Fx. Then 
x E K0 and i # 1. Hence S’(x, l)n(x, i)R’ = S’(x, l)n(x, i)S’nKb = 8. This is 
impossible. So (x, i) = Fx. Suppose x E 0. Then (x, i) E G- ‘0. Let (y, j) be in 
G- ‘0 n (x, i) R’. As is easily seen it follows that xRy. Also y E 0 and we are done. 
c Suppose x is a limit point of xR and (x, i) = Fx. Suppose (x, i) E 0’. Then 
for some (zl,j,), . . . . (z,,j,), (x, i) E (x, i) WS’nS’(z,,j,)n . ..nS’(z.,j,) =: 
0” E 0’. Clearly x E F- ‘0”. Let y be in F- ‘0” n xR. In case x q! K1 we have 
(x, i) #K; , hence (x, i) R’Fy and Fy E 0”. In case x E K1, we find y E KO. It follows 
that (x, i) R’( y, 0). Also (y,O)S’Fy and Fy E O”, hence by our choice of O”, 
(Y, 0) E 0”. 0 
5.20. Fact. Suppose 5 is a compact set-frame. Then Gsg is compact. 
Proof. To show that compactness i preserved, it is sufficient o show that each of the 
properties (i)-(iv) of 5.8 is preserved. Preservation of (i)-(iii) is easy. We treat (iv). 
Suppose that in 5 every element that has an antidirect successor is a limit point. 
Consider (x, i) in 3’ and suppose (x, i) has an antidirect successor (y, j). Clearly 
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i 4 (2,3, . . . }. Moreover if i = 0 and x E Kc, then (x, i) is a limit point and we are done. 
So we may assume that (x, i) = Fx. By 5.19(i) we only need to show that x is a limit 
point, hence it is sufficient to see that y is an antidirect successor of x. Suppose 
xSn WSy has a minimum z. Clearly (z, 0) E (x, i)S’n WS’(y,j), so there is a (u, s) 
with (x, i)S’(u, s) and (u, s)S’(z, 0). Because (x, i) = Fx it follows that xSu. 
Moreover clearly t&z. Contradiction. 0 
5.21. Definition. We define an operation Ys on set-models as follows: 
Let us call Ys (5, f ): (g’, f’). Obviously (s’, f’) is a set-model. 
5.22. Theorem. Let r be a set of formulas that is closed under subformulas. Let 
8 = (3, f) be a set-model. (g’, f ‘) := u1,(& f ). Suppose that for every A4 in r and 
for every x in KO; x It Ac$ -+ 4(f). Then for every $ in r and every (y, j) in K’, 
(yJ)I~$(f’) * Yltll/(f). 
Proof. By induction on 11/ in r. The cases of the atoms, 1,-i, A, v, -+ and c) are 
trivial. We treat A and q . Suppose II/ is Ax. Suppose y It Ax(f) and (y, j)S’(u, s). In 
case ySu we have u IF x(f) and thus by the induction hypothesis, (u, s) It x( f ‘). In case 
not ySu we have y E Kc,, y = u and j 4 s. Because y E K,, it follows that y It x(f). 
Hence by the induction hypothesis, (y, s) Ik x( f ‘). Conversely assume (y, j) IF Ax( f ‘) 
and ySu. Clearly ( y, j) S’ (u, 0), hence (u, 0) It x( f ‘) and so by the induction hypothe- 
sis, u It x( f ). 
Suppose II/ is ox. Suppose y Ik q x( f) and (y, j)R’(u, s). As is easily seen it follows 
that yRu, hence u Ik x( f ). By induction hypothesis, (u, s) Il- x( f ‘). Conversely assume 
(y, j) It q x( f’) and yRu. Clearly (y, j)R’(u, 0), hence (u, 0) It ~(1’). By the induc- 
tion hypothesis, u It- x( f ). 0 
Note that we could trivially strengthen 5.22 by replacing r by the closure of r under 
the truthfunctional connectives. 
5.23. Definition. We define an operation QR on set-frames with bottom as follows: 
(J&g:= 8’, where 3’ = (K’, Kb, K;, S’), with 
K’:= {(x, i) ( x E K and ((x = b and i E co) or (x # b and i = 0))}, 
Kb:= {(x, i) E K’I (b E K1 and ((x = b and i # 0) or (x # b and x E KO))) or 
(b 4 K1 and x E J&J}, 
K; := {(x, i) E K’( x E K,}, 
(x, i)S’(y, j) :o xSy or (x = y = b and i < j). 
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We define two functions H and J, respectively, from K to K’ and from K’ to K as 
follows: Hx:= (x, 0) if x # b, Hb:= (b, l), J(x, i):= x. By a trivial variation on the 
proof of 5.18 we find the following. 
5.24. Fact. Under the conditions of 5.23, (i) 5’ is a set-frame with bottom (b, 0) and 
(ii) H and J are continuous. 
5.25. Fact. Under the conditions of 5.23, 
(i) (x, i) is a limit point in 5’ o (x, i) = (b, 0) or (x, i) = Hx and x is a limit point 
of 5 and 
(ii) (x, i) is a limit point of (x, i) R’ o (x, i) = (b, 0) or (x, i) = Hx and x is a limit 
point of xR. 
5.26. Fact. Suppose i’j is a compact set-frame with bottom. Then aRS is compact with 
bottom. 
5.27. Definition. We define an operation YR on set-models with bottom as follows: 
~R(5,f):=(~RS,J-10f). ObviouslyQR(&f)isaset-model with bottom. 
5.28. Theorem. Let (5, f) be a set-model with bottom; let (3’f ‘) := !Pn(& f ). Let 
I’ be a set offormulas that is closed under subformulas. Suppose that for every 04 in l? 
b IF 04 -+ 4(f) and that for every AC$I in r, b It- AC#J -+ 4. Then for every I+G in r and for 
every (y,j) in K’, (~,j)ltIL(f’) * yltll/(f). 
Proof. Trivially for y # b, ( y, 0) Ik +( f ‘) o yltll/(f). So it is sufficient to show 
(b, i) Ik t,,Q( f ‘) o b It $( f ). This is done by an easy induction on Ic/ which we leave to 
the reader. 0 
Note that we could strengthen 5.28 by replacing r by the closure of r under the 
truthfunctional connectives. We turn to the Henkin construction. This construction is 
essentially the same as the one in [6] and as the one in [S]. 
5.29. The Henkin Construction. Let X be a set of formulas of 2. We write XF4 for: 
there is a finite X0 E X such that CSMo I-( M X,) + 4. 
Fix a set r of formulas that is closed under subformulas. A set X is r-saturated iff 
X~r,Xhllandforall4and$inT,Xl-4v$ * $EXorIC/EX.NotethatifXis 
r-saturated then XI-4 =z. 4 E X. 
By an entirely routine argument one may show: for every Y G r such that Y &#I 
there is a r-saturated X such that Y c X and X hL$. 
We define a premodel 8, : = (3, f ), where $j = (K, R, S) as follows: 
l K := {X c r 1 X is r-saturated}. (Note that K is non-empty.) 
l XRY:~(CI$EX 3 ~,u$JEY) and (A$EX * &A~EY) and for some II/, 
(A$ E Y and A$#X) or (o$ E Y and 01+9$x). 
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l XSY :* (04 EX 3 04 E Y) and (A$ EX * 4, A4 E Y) and for some $, 
(A$ E Y and d$$X) or (o$ E Y and q $#X). 
Clearly R ad S are irreflexive and transitive. Moreover XSYRZ * XRZ, and 
R E S. Define fpi:= {X E K 1 pi E X}. Clearly 8, is a premodel. We have for 4 in 
randXinK,Xlt-4(f) o $EX. 
The above result can be proved by induction on 4 in r. The cases of atoms and the 
truth functional connectives are trivial. 
Suppose 4 = q tj. Suppose q $ E X and XRY. Clearly $ E Y so by the induction 
hypothesis, Y I/- +(f). Conversely suppose that q lc/ 4 X. Define 
We claim X, h’$. If it did we would have 
and hence XFo(@ + $). Thus it would follow that Xl-@, quod non. 
Let Y be r-saturated such that X, E Y and Y h’ll/. It is easily seen that XRY and 
$ # Y. By the induction hypothesis, Y IVtj(f). 
Suppose q3 = A$. Suppose All/ E X and XSY. Clearly $ E Y. Thus by induction 
hypothesis, Y It $0. Conversely suppose A$ $X. Define 
We claim Xd h’ll/. If it did we would have { 0x1 ox E X} u {x, Ax I Ax E X}t-A$ + $, 
and hence Xl-A(A$ + $). Thus it would follow that Xk-A$, quod non. 
Let Y be saturated such that Xd G Y and Y h’$. It is easily seen that XSY and 
$ $ Y. By the induction hypothesis, Y IV+(f). 
5.30. Completeness for CSMo. Suppose CSMo h’@. Then there is a compact Carl- 
son-frame & such that ?J, IV$. 
Proof. Let r := the set of subformulas of 4. Construct 8, := XB,. Say 8, = (&,h) 
and s:, = (K,, K,,,, S,). Because r is finite, 8, is finite, Q,, trivializes to the discrete 
topology and 8, is compact. Hence 8, is a model. There is a r-saturated set X such 
that X #4. By 5.29 and 5.16 we have (X) IV+(h). It follows that 7ja IV& lJ 
5.31. Definition. Let 3 = (K, R, S) be a frame and let x E K. Define s[x] := 
(K’,R’,S’), where K’:={y~KlxbVSy}, R’:= RtK’, S’:=StK’. If Q = (S,f) is 
a model, define cti[x]:= (~[x],f[x]), wheref[x]pi:=fpinK’. It is easily seen that 
g[x] and 8 [x] are again frame, respectively, model. Clearly for x E K’, 
x k$(f) o x It 4(f[x]). This definition is trivially adapted to Carlson-frames, etc. 
5.32. Completeness for CSMi. Suppose CSMi #-4. Then there is an compact Carlson- 
l-frame 3 such that slV4. 
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Proof. Suppose CSMl hL$. Define x := ( /x\ (o(dll/ + $) 1 A t,b is a subformula of 4) + 
4) Clearly CSMo V-x. Let r := {$I $ is a subformula of x}. Consider the tree-ification 
of the Henkin premodel for r, i.e. consider E$, with (I&,:= XB, (see 5.29 and 5.16(i)). 
&, is finite so Oei, is discrete. Thus &, is a compact model. There is a node x of Kb such 
that xtko(dt,b+t,b)(f) f b , or all subformulas A$ of 4, and x II?‘#(&). We may assume 
that x is of the form (X}, so that x&J&. 
Consider @[xl. Say 8, := Qb[x]. Clearly G5, is compact. Let r0 be the set of 
subformulas of 4. Trivially for all y E KaO and for all Al// in r,, y It A$ + $(fa)_ We 
change the elements of KaO into limits by transforming 8, into U with Q := YsS,. Let 
b:= (x, 0). Clearly b is the bottom of Q. Say 8 = (g,S}. By 5.19 and 5.20 8 is 
a compact Carlson-l-model and by 5.22 and the fact that 4 is in &,, b lli 4(f). 0 
5.33. Definition. Let j’j = (K, KO, S) be a Carlson-frame and let x E K. Define 
F(x):= (K’,Kb,S’), whereK’:= (~EK~xWS~},K~:=(K~~K’)~{~},S’:= S/K’. 
If Q = QLj-> is a Carlson-model we define 8 (x) := (F(x), f(x)>, where 
f (x>pi := fpi n K’. Clearly 5 (x) and 8 (x) are a Carlson-frame, respectively, aCarl- 
son-model. For y E K’ we have y II&f) o y II-&f(x)). 
5.34. Completeness for CSM2, Suppose CSM2 I##. Then there is a compact Carlson- 
l-frame 3 = (K, K,,, S} and an x E KO such that x IV& 
Proof. Suppose CSM2 &#A Let f, := {$I+ is a subformula of $}. Define 
and r:= {$I$ is a subformula of x}. Clearly CSMo hLx. Let (I%:= XBr. @J, is 
a compact Carlson-model. There is an x in Kb such that x II A+ -+ $(fb) and 
xlk q (A$ --) t,@(h) for all A$ in I’,‘, and xlU$~(&). 
Consider O,(x). Say Q, := S,(x). Clearly for all y E KaO and A$ E TO, 
y II Ati + I,+(L). Define Q := Y& and b:= (x, O}. Say @ = (g,f ). Q is a compact 
Carlson-l-model, b E KO and by 5.22, b IV4(f). 0 
5.35. Completeness for CSM3. Suppose CSM3 bL$. Then there is a Carlson-3-frame 
3 with bottom b such that b IY 4. 
Proof. Suppose CSMJ hL$. Let r0 := (9 I$ is a subformula of $}. Define 
Let r:= {$[tj is a subformula of 2). Clearly CSMo #fx. Consider Qb := XB,. Clearly 
@, is a compact Carlson-model. There is an x such that x It- a$ -P $(JJ for I-J# E r,, 
x 11 All/ --+ $(fb) and x It q (A$ + rl/)(&) for A$ E rO and x IV&(.&). 
Consider Q, [x]. Say Gi, := Ob [x], Clearly for all y E K,, and all A+ E r,, 
Y lW -+ VU). M oreover x IkA$ + $(fa) for all A$ E r, and x It- q t,h + Il/(f,) for all 
q $~G,.Let O:= Y~!PRGOandb:= ((x,O),O).Say8 = (g,f).By5.19and5.20we 
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find that 8 is a compact Carlson-3-model. By 5.22, 5.28 and the fact that 4 E r0 we 
find b IV4(f). 0 
5.36. Completeness of NB1. Suppose NB1 h’& Then there is a compact set-l-frame 
3 with F I#$. 
Proof. Suppose NB1 t&. Let I’, := { tj ( $ . 1s a subformula of $1. Define: A +p := p A Ap. 
x:=((A+/x\ {(Laos@ -,0(411/~~)(ga,All/~T~})-‘~)andr:={~II(/isasub- 
formula of x}. Clearly CSMo hLx. Take Qd:= 8,-. There is an x E Kd with 
for all ga and A$ in I-, and x IY 4(fd). Let r, := r, u { Ap ( up E To} and let 
(si,:= A((lid, I’,). 8, is a compact set-model. Let x,:= (x). Clearly x, lV$~(fc). Suppose 
y, E KrO andx,WS,y,. We have y, = (y,, . . . , yk), where y, = x, yk _ 1 Rd y, and there is 
an i with 1 < i < k and there is a q a E r0 such that yi It IJO and yi IY do(&). XWSyi 
and thus yi Ik q (A$ + $)(fd) for all A$ E &,. Finally y,Rdy, SO y, IF Al// -+ Il/(fJ for all 
A$ E r,. We may conclude y, It A$ -+ $(fc) for all Atj E r,. 
Construct Gjb:= S,[x,]. By the above, for all yb E &,, yblt- All/ + +(fb) for all 
A$ E r,. Let 8 := ysu,ctib, say (fi = (g,f). Clearly 8 is a compact set-l-model and 
(x,, 0) IV 4(f). cl 
5.37. Completeness of NB2. Suppose NB2 h’4. Then there is a compact set-2-frame 
5 with bottom b such that b IV 4. 
Proof. Suppose NB2 V4. Let rc, := ($I+ is a subformula of 4). Define 
r := {$I+ is a subformula of x}. Clearly CSM,, #x. 
Take Q,:= B,.. There is an x E K, with 
x II- A+((1 Aa A q a) -+ q (A$ -, $))(fc), 
x It 00 + o(h), x It q a + Aa 
for all q a and A$ in r, and x IV&j& 
Let r, := rou {Aal q a E ro} and let &,I= A(@,, r,). 6&, is a compact set-model. Let 
xb := (x). Clearly xb IV 4(fb). By the same reasoning as in 5.36 we have that for 
Yb 6 KbO with XbWSbYb? yb It W + ti(.h) f or all A$ E r,. Moreover xb IF 00 + Ar7(fb) 
for all 00 E I’, and hence x$Kbl. 
Construct ej,:= @&,[_$I. By the above, for all y, E KaO, y, It All/ + Ii/(h) for all 
A~~T~andx,I~A~~~(f,),xIt~a -+ a(fJ for all A+, DO E r,. Let (fi:= !PsYRB,, 
say 6 = (&f). Clearly 8 is a compact set-Zmodel and ((xb, 0), 0) lU4(f). 0 
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5.38. Corollary. The following facts are rather obvious using completeness for the 
appropriate arithmetical interpretations. They have however also purely Kripke model 
proofs. 
(i) CSMil-4 o CSMil-A4 o CSM,FA$ o CSM,FAI$, 
(ii) CSM2k4 - CSMi kc14 o CSM2k04 - CSM,l-04, 
(iii) NBil-4 - NB1 t-A4 o NB1t--04 o NB,!-A4 o NB21-04, 
(iv) Let $ E J&,, then Lt-$ o CSMil-II/ 0 CSM21-11/ - NBi l-$. 
6. The closed fragment of CSM, 
Let 62 be the set of closed formulas (i.e. of formulas not containing propositional 
variables) of 2. We describe the behaviour of the 62 formulas in CSM1. Define for 
4 in 2, q I’~:= 4, q “+i4:= on”4 and A’$:= 4, A”+‘+:= AA”& Define further 
I UJ.lPl+n. *= A”o”1 and I, := T. Let CI and /I range over u2 u { co}. We stipulate that 
foralla,cr<co,that co+a=cr+co=cc andthat co.c1=c(.co=oo fora#O. 
We describe the closed fragment without proofs. Let 4 be a Boolean combination of 
1,‘s then for some /I, CSM,FA$J~I,. Moreover B = y + 1 and CSMi t- 
(4 A A4)- I,. Let 4 be a Boolean combination of _L.‘s, then for some /I E ou { oo}, 
CSMi ko4 - I,.,. Consider any II/ E U?!. We have $ is provably equivalent in 
CSMi to a Boolean combination of 1,‘s. 
Let so:= ({0),$,8). C onsider @&J~S~. This last frame corresponds precisely with 
the closed fragment of CSM1, i.e. (i) for every proposition X of @S@RgO there is 
a 6 E 652 such that X = [4]f, where fpi = 0 f or all i, and (ii) for all 4 E U?, CSMi ~~ 
o QjS@&jO IF 4 (thus for all +, 0 E (Pi?, CSMl l-$ ~1 cr o [$I f = [crj f ). 
@s@RgO is isomorphic to the following frame. Define 
fi2:= ((~2\{O})u{co}, {o.n[n E co>, C), where crZfl :o tl > /3. 
Note that a IF _Lp( f) o a ,< /I. Q2 with the empty assignment is precisely the Henkin 
model of CSMl w.r.t. 62. 
Finally let 4 E 62. We have CSM2+ o for all n, w.nItcj(f), CSM31-4 
* 00 W(f). 
NBi does not have such a well behaved closed fragment. This is plausible also from 
the arithmetical point of view: NB1 is ‘about’ a number of different arithmetical 
interpretations of A at the same time. Many (all?) of these interpretations taken by 
themselves would yield a different provability logic and thus a different closed fragment. 
Open Question: Is there some interesting description of the closed fragment of NBi? 
7. Arithmetical completeness results 
Our aim in this section is to embed certain frames employed in the various modal 
completeness theorems into arithmetic. The precise nature of these embeddings will 
A. Visser / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 73 (I 995) 109-l 42 129 
depend on the chosen interpretation of the bimodal logic involved. All embeddings 
map the propositions of the frames on equivalence classes of the relevant sort (e.g. 
w.r.t. provable equivalence in PA) of arithmetical sentences and ‘commute’ with the 
corresponding connectives and operators. 
The neatest way to build the embeddings i  in two stages. The first stage is common 
to all embeddings: we go from clopens to (equivalence classes of) arithmetical 
formulas in one variable that represent he clopens as sets of numbers in a canonical 
way. In the second stage we go from these formulas to sentences by something like 
substituting a term for the one free variable. We proceed to describe the first stage. 
The frames we are going to embed all have the form @@a&, where &, is a _/ifinite 
set-frame. We assume that the domain K, of & consists of numbers 0, . , . , n and that 
( . . .) is a standard numerical coding of sequences. Thus the elements of the domain of 
g:= QisQR& will be numbers and simple arithmetical descriptions of Kc,, Ki, S (and 
hence of R) can be read of from our definitions of Qs and QR. In arithmetical contexts 
we will simply confuse K, KO, etc. with their arithmetical descriptions. All kinds of 
simple facts about K, KO, etc. can be formalized in PA - like: S is transitive, treelike, 
upwards wellfounded. The facts we need will be collected along the way. 
Let A be an arithmetical formula with just x free. Instead of the usual notation Ax 
to exhibit the free occurrence of x in A, we will use x E A to show our intention that 
A stands for a set. 
Let A and B be arithmetical formulas with just x free. Define 
What we are going to do is map the propositions X of frames of the form @#a&, 
where 3, is Jinite set-frame with bottom, on g-equivalence classes in such a way that 
each element of the equivalence class assigned to X represents X as a set. (Clearly 
there are also inequivalent formulas that represent X as a set). Even if it is not strictly 
necessary the most pleasant way to give the representation is via a normal form 
theorem for clopens in compact frames. A normal form for a clopen X is going to be 
a designated finite set of clopens Nx such that X = UN,. 
7. I. Normal forms for clopens 
Consider a compact frame 5 = (K, R, S). Let x, y be elements of K. We call 
xWSn WSy an interval just in case xWSy and y is not a limit. If xWSn WSy is an 
interval we use the notation [x, y]. As is easily seen intervals are clopen. Let X be 
clopen (and thus compact). 
7.1.1. Prenormal forms for clopens. There is ajinite collection of intervals M such that 
X=uM. 
Proof. By compactness it is sufficient o produce a collection of intervals P such that 
X = UP. If x E X is not a limit put I, : = [x, x]. Suppose x is a limit. x WS nX is open, 
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hence there is a y such that y # x and y E xWSnX. Pick a maximal such y, say y,. 
y. cannot be a limit, otherwise there would be a z with z # y and z E y,WSnX, 
hence y,Sz and z E xWSnX, contradicting the maximality of yo. Put I, := [x, yo]. 
Define P:= (I,lx E X}. 0 
7.12. Normal form theorem. There is a uniquejinite collection of intervals Nx such that 
(i) X = UN,. 
(ii) Cx, ~1 E Nx, Cu, 01 6 Nx and Cx, ~1 E Cu, 01 * Cx, ~1 = Cu, VI. 
(iii) [z, w] c X * 3 [x, y] E Nx [z, w] E [x, y]. 
Proof. It is easily verified that conditions (i)-(iii) imply uniqueness. To prove exist- 
ence, consider a finite set of intervals A4 such that X = uA4. We convert M into Nx. 
Clearly by compactness and treelikeness every x in K which is not a bottom element 
has an S-predecessor. We write ‘y = pa(x),, for y is the S-predecessor of x. We define 
a relation between pairs ([x, y], q), where q E [x, y], as follows: 
(Cx, ~1, q)Q(Cu, ~1, r> :* r-W4 E Cq, ~1. 
We collect two simple facts about Q: 
(a) (Cx, ~1, q)Q (Cu, ~1, r> = Cx, ~1 is an interval, Ex, ~1 = Cx, pW1 u Cr, ~1 E 
cx, Yl u cu, VI. 
04 (Cx, ~1, q)Q(Cu, 01, r>Q<Cz, ~1, s> = (Lx, ~1, r>Q(Cz, ~1, s>. 
Define 
P:= {[x,y]lthere is a Q-chain ([xl,yl],ql)Q . ..Q([~~.y,,],q,,), such that 
[Xiv YiI E My x = x1, Y = Y,>. 
Clearly P is finite and by (a), (b) P is a set of intervals satisfying UP = X. 
Let NX be the set of s-maximal elements of P. It is immediate that Nx as defined 
satisfies (i) and (ii). We verify (iii): consider [z, w] G X. It is sufficient to produce 
[x, y] E P with [z, w] E [x, y]. We produce a Q-chain of pairs ([xi, yi], qi) with 
qi E [Z, W] as fOllOWS: 
Step 1: Pick [x1, yi] E M such that z E [x1, yl]. Let q1 be z. 
Step i + 1: Suppose we have produced ([xi, yi], qi). Let pi be the maximum of 
[xi, yi] n [z, w]. AS is easily seen pi is not a limit. If pi = w we stop and put n:= i. If 
pi # W, let qi+ 1 be the immediate S-successor of pi in [z, w] and pick [Xi+ 1, yi+ 1] E M 
such that qi+l is in [Xi+l,yi+l]. It is immediate that ([xi,yi],qi)Q([xi+l,yi+l], 
qi + I >. Moreover qJqi + I, hence our procedure stops by the upwards wellfounded- 
ness of S. Finally define [x,y] := [xl, yJ. Clearly xl WSzWSwWSy,,, so 
cz, WI 2 cx, Yl. 0 
Consider a frame 5 of the form GjSGjR&, where ‘& is a finite set-model with bottom. 
Let X be a proposition of 5. We represent X by rX1 in the language of arithmetic 
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with just x free, where x E ‘Xl:= W {x E [n_r, n_] l[m, n] E N,}. Note that 
m E X j PAkm E rX1, m$X 3 PA!-lm E rXl. It follows that if X # Y, then 
PAH~((~E’X~A~~‘Y~)~(~$‘X~A~E’Y~)), 
hence not rX1 E rY1. 
Define for arithmetical formulas A with just x free, dA and q A by 
x E dA := Vy(xSy + y E A); x E q A := Vy(xRy + y E A). 
7.2. Lemma. Let X be a proposition of 3. Suppose M is a prenormal form for X. Then 
W{x~[m,n]l[m,n]~M}~~X~. 
Proof. If [m, n] E M, then there is a [p, q] E Nx such that [m, n] c [p, q]. The 
(formalization of the) fact that [m, n] E [p, q] can easily be verified in PA. Conversely 
for [p,q] in Nx there is a Q-chain ([ml, nl], rI)Q . ..Q([mk. nJ, rk) in M such that 
[p, q] = [ml, nk]. The facts about Q-chains can be verified in PA and hence also the 
fact that [p, q] E UM. 0 
7.3. First commutation theorem. r. 7 commutes with the propositional constants, A and 
q modulo Z. 
Proof. The proof is long, boring and trivial. We just sketch it. Let X, Y be proposi- 
tions of 3. 
We show rll E 1. This one is easy: rll = I! 
We show rT1 z T. N, = {[b, t] 1 t is a top element of 5). The formalization of the 
fact that UN, = K is easily verified in PA. 
We show ‘Xv Yl Z ‘Xlv’Yl. Clearly rXlv’Y1 Z w {x E[%, n_]l 
[m, n] E Nx u NY}. N,u NY is a prenormal form for X v Y. The desired result follows 
from 7.2. 
We show ‘1 Xl g lrXl. Consider [m, n] E Nx and [p, q] E N,,. The fact that 
Cm, nl n CP, 41 = 8 is easily verified in PA. Consequently rXl A ‘1 X1 E I On the 
other hand X vlX = T, thus by the above rX1 v ‘1X1 2 rTl g T. We may 
conclude ‘1 X1 E 1 rX1. 
We show ‘AX1 g A’Xl. Clearly, by the above, it is sufficient to show 
PA I-Vx x E ‘1 AXlo 3 y(xSy A y E rl Xl). 
Consider M := {[b, pd(n)] 1 [m, n] E N,,}. M is a prenormal form for 1 AX. By 7.2, 
W {x E [ni, rz] 1 [m, n] E M} r rl AX1. It is easily verified that 
PAEVx W {xE[tg,g]~[m,n]EM}+-+~y(x~yAyEriX1). 
Finally we show rgX1 E q rX1. Clearly, by the above, it is sufficient to show 
PA +v’x x E rl OX-‘+-+ 3y(xRy A y E rl x1). 
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First note that for every interval [p, q], [p, q] n K; is also an interval. Define 
l(m, n) := max(KO n [m, n]). 
Consider 
u { Cb, pW(m, 4)lMm, 4 exists, Cm,nl E NT,}. 
M is a prenormal form for 1 OX, so by 7.2, W {x E [VI, n_] I [m, n] E M} z ‘1 OX’. 
We show PAl-Vx W {x E [rg, n_] 1 [m, n] E M} ++ 3 y(xRy A y E rl Xl). 
Reason in PA (We will insert remarks that are best viewed as coming from outside 
PA; these will be in italics). Suppose x E [b_, n_], for [b, n] E M. Clearly for some k in 
1 X: nRk, hence xRk. Say k E [I, s] E N-,x. Then k E [1_, s]. It follows that 3 y (xRy and 
y E '1X1). 
Conversely suppose xRy and y E [I_, ~1, for [I, s] in N,,. Suppose x $ Ki . In this 
case x E [b, pd($] n K; = [b, r] for some r. (The reader should convince him/herself by 
inspecting the coding that PA indeed proves the identity: [b, pd(S)] n K’, = [b, r].) 
Clearly [b, r] E M. Suppose x E K1. In case [1, s] n KO = 8 this is verifiable in PA and 
hence 1. In case [I, s] n K,, # 8, ,I(l, s) exists and hence n(i, 3) = q for some q. (The 
reader should convince himlherselfthat PA verifies this last identity.) Hence yWSq and 
thus x E C11, pd(g)l = Cb, pWd1. Clearb Cb, p&d1 E M. 
The other cases follow from the cases treated thus far. This completes the proof of 
the theorem. 0 
7.4. Fact. (i) Remember that par abus de langage we write x E K1 for the arithmetiz- 
ation of x E K1 that can be read oflfrom a description of & and the definitions of @n 
and Qs. We have PAkx E K1 ctx E rK1l. 
(ii) PA~-(xEK,,AV~EXS~E~X~)+XE~X~. 
We proceed to the second stage. This stage splits into cases depending on the 
chosen interpretation of the logic involved. In all cases a primitive recursive function 
h will be introduced, with the property: PAtVxVy(x < y + hx WShy). Let 
Lx := (3 yVz 2 y hz = x). We have PA l-3 !xLx. We use L as a semiterm for the unique 
x such that Lx. Define [X] := (L E rX1). [X] is the arithmetical image of X that we 
are after (modulo an equivalence relation like provable equivalence). Note that 
PAFCXI ++ W {L E Cm, cl ICm, nl E b}. 
And that PAt-L E [m, n_] ~((3 x mWShx) A (Vy hyWSn_)). It follows that [X] is 
provably equivalent in PA to a Boolean combination of C,-formulas. 
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7.5. The NB theories 
Consider a set-2-frame 5 of the form @&jR&, where &, is a set-frame with bottom 
b, with b, $ I&. 
Remember that if x is the Giidel number of a proof 71, then e(x) is the largest of the 
Gijdel numbers of arithmetical axioms occurring in 71. We plausibly assume d(x) < x. 
Define both by the recursion theorem and by course of values recursion: 
hO:= b, h(x + l):= y if hxRy and Proof,,(x, L # y); 
h(x + l):= y if hxSy, ProofpA(x, L # y), Vy < e(x) hy$Kl; 
h(x + l):= hx otherwise, 
L:= theuniquexsuchthat3y~z~yhz=x;S:=3yhyEK,;[X]:=LErX1 
(Note that ‘Vy d e(x) hy 4 K1’ could even be simplified to h(ex) $ K1 .) 
7.5.1. Lemma. (i) PAt-x < y + hx WShy; (ii) PAkL exists. 
7.5.2. Second commutation theorem. [ . ] commutes with the propositional logical con- 
stants (modulo provability in PA) and 
(4 PA~CW c*~~,~[XI; 
(b) PAt-[17X1- q pA[XI. 
Proof. The cases of the propositional ogical constants are trivial by 7.5.1 and the first 
commutation theorem (7.3). 
Case (a): -+ Reason in PA. Suppose [AX]. Say L = x E ‘AX1 and hence 
L=xtzArXl. 
First suppose x = b. If b is indeed in AX, we have AX = X = T and hence ApAL E X. 
If b is not in AX we have I, and hence ApAL E X. 
Suppose x # b. Let u be the smallest number such that hu = x. Clearly u is 
a successor, say u = v + A. By the definition of h Proof,,(v, L # x). We distinguish 
two cases. 
Case I: Suppose hv +! K1. Surely ev < v, hence for all y < ev, hy $ K1. Thus we have 
both Proof,,(v, L # x) and for all y < ev, hy$ K1, hence APA,SL # x. By C-complete- 
ness we have APA,~hu = x. Ergo A PA,S~SL and so (by the fact that x E ‘AXl, and by 
C-completeness), APA,S~ E ‘AXl, thus by the first commutation theorem 
A pA,Sx E A’X’, ApA,SL E rX1. 
Case II: Suppose ho E K1. We distinguish two subcases. 
Subcase II(i): Suppose x E Ko. By C-completeness we have APA,Shu = x and so 
ApA,sxWSL. Also we have ApA,Sx E Ko, A~A,SX E ‘AX1 and hence APA,Sx E ArX1. It 
follows by 7.4(ii) that ApA,S Vy(xWSy + y E rX1). Ergo ApA,SL E rXl. 
Subcase II( Suppose x+! Ko. We have A pA,sL # x (how else could h move up 
from hv, which is in K1, to x, which is not in Ko?). Also ApA,Shu = x. Ergo ApA,SxSL 
and hence: ApA,s L E rX1. 
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Case (a): c Reason in PA. Suppose APA,s[X]. Suppose for a reductio 
L = x#~AX~. Clearly by 7.3, x$ ArX1 and hence for some y, xSy and yBrX1. By 
C-completeness, dPA,sy$rX1. Hence APA.sL # y. It follows that for some 
u Proof,,(u, L # y) and Vu < eu-iS,v i.e. Vu < eu, hv$K1. Because L = x, we have 
huWSxSy, hence huSy. By the definition of h, h(u + 1) = y. Contradiction. We may 
conclude L E ‘AX’, i.e. [AX]. 
Case (b): --) Reason in PA. Suppose [OX], say L = x E rnX1 and hence 
x E @X1. In case x = b, it is easily seen (by the same reasoning as under case a: + ) 
that upAL E rX1. Suppose x # b. Say hu = x. We have upAL # x (how else could 
h move up to x?) and by C-completeness, qpAhu = x. Hence q pAxSL. If x$Ki it 
follows that q pAxRL, hence upAL E rX1 and thus q PA[X]. Suppose x E K1 . We have 
3 y, hy E K1, i.e. S. Hence for any A, q PA(APA,sA + A). We claim upAL E KO. 
Reason inside opA. Suppose L = y 4 KO. We have xSy and x E K1. Thus 
APA,sL # y (how else could h move up from an element of K1 to y, y not being in Ko?). 
By ApA,s-reflection: L # y. Contradiction. We may conclude L E KO. 
We have q pAxSL, upAL E K,,. Hence q pAxRL and upAL E rX1, i.e. q pA[X]. 
Case (b): c Reason in PA. Suppose &A[X]. Suppose for a reductio 
,!, = ~#~gXl. By 7.3 there is a y with xRy and y $‘Xl. By C-completeness 
q pAy $ rX’. Hence from &AL E rX1, UpAL # y. Say ProofpA(u, L # y). From L = x, 
huWSxRy. Hence huRy. Thus by the definition of h, h(u + 1) = y. Contradiction. So 
we conclude L E ‘0X1, i.e. [OX]. 
Note that [ .] really has the character of an embedding: it is injective modulo 
provable equivalence in PA. For suppose X # Y. Inspection of the frame shows that 
for some k (((Xcr Y) A A(X* Y)) + 0~1) = T. Hence 
PAWKXI - [yl)” APA,s([~] * [yl)) -+ q PAkL- 
Suppose PAl-[X] H [Y]. It follows that PAI-([XI w [Y]) A APA,s([X] e-) [Y]), 
hence PAknpAkl. Quod non. 0 
7.5.3. Definition. Consider a set-2-model 8 = (&f). Suppose Q is of the form 
YsYR& where Q, = (&,fa) and 8, is a finite set-model (also finite in the sense that 
f,(p) = 0 for all but finitely many p), with bottom b, 4 Kal. 
Define for $J E 2, [$J]:= [[4jf]. Letf*p:= [p], and define (4):= (4)(f*, PA, S), 
where S is defined as in the beginning of 7.5. By a trivial induction on 4 using 7.5.2. we 
get the following result. 
7.5.4. Theorem. PAl-(4) H [$I. 
7.5.5. Arithmetical completeness for NB1. Suppose NB1 #$J. Then there is an inter- 
pretationfinctionf* and a Cl-sentence S such that PA h’($)(f*, PA, S). 
Proof. Suppose NBr # 4. Consider the finite set-model @, constructed in the proof of 
5.36. The bottom, say z of Ob forces 14 (under fb). Pick a b with b $ K,,. Define 8, as 
A. Visser / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 73 (1995) 109-142 135 
follows: K, : = Kb u {b}; KoO := KbO;Kal:=Kbl;Sa:=Sbu{(b,Y)IYEKb);~Y:=fbY, 
if y E Kb; fob :=fbz. Clearly b#KaI. Consider Oe:= YsYyRB,. Let u = ((z, 0), 0). 
Clearly the submodel with domain uWS, will be isomorphic to (si of the proof 
of 5.36. Hence, because uWS, is upwards closed, the forcing relations of ei, and 
8 of 5.36 will coincide on the nodes connected by the isomorphism. Ergo u IY 4(fe). 
It follows that [T4jfe # T, and hence that PA h’[#] (where [ .] is based on 8,). 
Thus PA I+($). 0 
7.5.6. Arithmetical completeness for NB2. Suppose NB2 h’~$. Then there is an inter- 
pretationfunction f* and a Cl-sentence S such that Ng($)(f*, PA, S). 
Proof. Suppose NB2 l@. Consider the model 8 of the proof of 5.37. Let b be the 
bottom of 8. We have b Iti 4(f). Consider h, [ .], etc. based on Q. Clearly NbL = b, 
hence Ni=l[4]. Thus 1Vd(4). 0 
7.6. The CSM theories 
Consider a Carlson-Zframe 5 of the form Q.&s&, where & is a Carlson-frame 
with bottom b,. Let U and T be RE theories in the language of PA, extending PA, 
such that for all sentences A of the language of PA, UF-drA + A. 
Define by the recursion theorem: 
hO:= b, h(x + l):= y if hxRy and Proofu(x, L # y), 
h(x + l):= y if hxSy and Proofr(x, L # y), := hx otherwise; 
L:= the unique x such that 3 yVz B y hz = x, [X] := L E rXl. 
7.6.1. Lemma. (i) PAFx < y + hxWShy; (ii) PAFL exists. 
7.6.2. Second commutation theorem. [ . ] commutes with the propositional logical con- 
stants (modulo provability in PA) and 
(a) PAI-[AX] ~1 dT[X]; 
(b) PAFCoXI ++ q oCX1. 
Proof. The cases of the propositional ogical constants are trivial by 7.6.1 and the first 
commutation theorem (7.3). The cases of A and q are very much like the correspond- 
ing cases in 7.5.2. 
Case (a): + Reason in PA. Suppose [AX]. Say L = x E ‘AX1 and hence 
L = x E A’Xl. The case that x = b is easy. Suppose x # b. Let u be the smallest 
number such that hu = x. Clearly u is a successor, say u = o + 1. We distinguish two 
cases. 
Case I: Suppose x E Ko. By C-completeness we have Arhu = x and so ArxWSL. 
Also we have drx E K,,, Arx E ‘AX1 and hence Arx E ArX1. It follows by 7.4(ii) that 
Ar’v’y(xWSy + y E rXl). Ergo ArL E rX1. 
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Case II: Suppose x#K,,. We have Proof,(u, L # x) (how else could h move up 
from hv to x, which is not in Kc?). Hence ATL # x. Also AThu = x. Ergo ATxSL and 
hence AT L E rX1. 
Case (a): c Reason in PA. Suppose AT[X]. Suppose for a reductio L = x $‘AXl. 
Clearly by 7.3, x q! ArX1 and hence for some y, xSy and y $ rX1. By C-completeness, 
ATy$rX7. Hence ATL # y. It follows that for some u Proof&, L # y). Because 
L = x, we have hu WSxSy, hence huSy. By the definition of h, h(u + 1) = y. Contradic- 
tion. 
We may conclude L E ‘AX-‘, i.e. [AX]. 
Case (b): + Reason in PA. Suppose [OX], say L = x E r~X1 and hence 
x E 0~x1. The case x = b is easy. Suppose x # b. Say hu = x. We have q uL # x (how 
else could h move up to x?) and by C-completeness, quhu = x. Hence q uxSL. We 
claim 0” L E KO. 
Reason inside q u. Suppose L = y$Ko. We have xSy. Thus ATL # y (how else 
could h move up to y, y not being in Kc,?). By AT-reflection L # y. Contradiction. We 
conclude L E KO. 
We have &,xSL and q uL E K,,. Hence q uxRL and thus q uL E rX1, i.e. q c[X]. 
Case (b): c Reason in PA. Suppose q V[X]. Suppose for a reductio, 
L = x $rgXl. By 7.3 there is a y with xRy and y .$‘-Xl. By C-completeness, 
q uy$rXl. Hence from q uL E rX1, or/L # y. Say Proof”(u, L # y). From L = x, 
huWSxRy. Hence huRy. Thus by the definition of h, h(u + I) = y. Contradiction. We 
may conclude L E ‘0X1, i.e. [OX]. 0 
7.6.3. Definition. Consider a Carlson-2-model8 = (5, f ). Suppose 8 is of the form 
YsYRS,, where Q, = (5, fO) and Qs is a finite Carlson-model (also finite in the sense 
that f,(p) = 8 for all but finitely many p), with bottom b,. Define for 4 E L, [$] := 
[[4Jf]. Letf*p:= [p], and define (4):= (#~)(f*, U, T). 
7.6.4. Theorem. PA k (4) c* [$I. 
Proof. By a trivial induction on 4 using 7.6.2. •l 
7.6.5. Definition. Let 3 be a compact set-frame. Define d from K to the ordinals by 
dx:= 1 + sup(dylxSy}. Note that if x is a top element, dx = 1. 
7.6.6. Fact. Let 3 be of the form QsQR&, where & is a jinite Carlson-frame with 
bottom. Let d*x:= dx if dx < w2, d*x:= co otherwise. We have for a E o2 u {CO}, 
d*x<a o xltl,. 
7.6.7. Definition. 
0) LW, V:= (4If or all interpretation functionsf T k(b) (1; U, T)}, 
LZUJ, n:= (4If or all interpretation functionsf U l-(&)(f, U, T)}, 
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(ii) CSMl(cl):= CSMl + I, (CI E 02u{cc)), 
CSMG):= CSMz + l,l,.,i (B E au @>). 
7.6.8. Theorem. &(U, T) = CSM,(cc) and L,(U, T) = CSM,(fi) for some c1 with 
O!EW~U{CO} and some ~ECOU{CO}, such that w.~<a<co.(/?+ 1). (Note that if 
either c( or fl are co then LI(U, T) = CSMi and L2(U, T) = CSM2.) 
Proof. First we show L1 (U, T) = CSMi(a) for some c( E o* u { co>. If x is in the closed 
fragment, (x) (f, U, T) is independent off, so let us write (y) (U, T) instead. Evidently 
Tt-(I,)(U, 7’). Let tl be the smallest element of w2 u { co} such that T I-(_LJ (U, T). 
Clearly CSMi(cr) E Li(U, T). 
Suppose $ E L,(U, T) and CSMl(a) t&. It follows that CSMi h’l, + $. Consider 
the Carlson-model 8, constructed in 5.32 for 4 := (I, + II/) with bottom x. Construct 
Ge:= YsYR6,. Let z:= ((x, l), 0). Clearly the restriction of 6, to zWS, is isomor- 
phic to 8 of 5.32. Hence, because zWS, is upwards closed, the forcing relations of 8, 
and 8 will coincide on the nodes connected by the isomorphism. Consequently 
z IY 4(fe), hence z It la(fe) and z IV$(fJ. We claim that for some /I < LX and for all 
u E K,, a lk(Ic/ A A$) + &(fe). 
Inspection of the model shows that below z there just is a long tail, so 
vlt(lC/ A d$)(fe) implies zS,v. Let vl, . . . , v, be the minimal elements of [$ A A$jfe 
(these exist e.g. by the normal form theorem). We have d*z < c( and hence d*vi < CI 
(i = 1, . . . , n). Let /I be the maximum of the d*vi. We have /I < c( and Vi It-Ls(fe) 
(i = 1, . . , n). We may conclude [(+ A A$) + _LB] (fJ = T. 
Let [ . ] and ( . ) be based on 6,. Then PAk-((I// A A$) + I,), hence 
T!-(($A A$)--+ -Lp), so Tt-(($)A AT($))+(_Ll(). On the other hand Tk($), 
hence Tk($) A AT($). Ergo Tt-(l,), i.e. Tl--(I&(U, T). Quod non. We may 
conclude L1(U, T) = CSMl (a). 
Secondly we show L,(U, T) = CSM,(b) for some fi E o u { co}. Evidently 
Ut-(-l%J.,)(U, V 
Let /I be the smallest element of ou{co} such that Ut-(I,,,B)(U, T). Note that, by 
AT-reflection, for no y < O./I, Uk-(I,)(U, T). Clearly CSM,(/?) c L,(U, T). 
Suppose $ E L,(U, T) and CSM,(P) hL$. It follows that CSM2 tfl,., + $. Con- 
sider the Carlson-model 8, constructed in 5.34 for 4:= (IX -+ $) with bottom x. 
Construct eje:= YsYRO,. Let z:= ((x, 1), 0). Note that z E Z&. Clearly the restric- 
tion of 6, to z WS, is isomorphic to 8 of 5.34. Hence, because zWS, is upwards closed, 
the forcing relations of 8, and 8 coincide on the nodes connected by the isomor- 
phism. Consequently zlV$(fJ, hence zltl,,,&&) and zlU$(fe). We claim that for 
some y < W./I and for all u E K,, u Ik($ A q t,b) --f I&_&). 
Below z there just is a long tail, so, because z E Keo, v Ik($ A q t,b)(fe) implies zS,u. 
Let v 1, . . . , u, be the minimal elements of [$ A q $jfe. We have d*z < o.fl and hence 
d*vi < w.P (i = 1, . . . . n). Let y be the maximum of the d*oi. We have y < O./I and 
OiIkl_~(fJ (i = 1, ...) n). Ergo [I($ A q $) -+ I,] (fe) = T. 
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Let [ .] and ( . ) be based on 8,. We have PA!-(($ A q $) + l.?) and hence 
U!-((~(/Ao$)+ I,), so UF(($)r\oo(ll/))-‘(I,). On the other hand VI-($), 
and hence UF(rl/) A mu(+). Ergo Ut-(l,), i.e. Uk(I,)(U, T). Quod non. Thus 
L,(U, T) = CSM,(P). 
Suppose L1(U, T) = CSMl(cc) and L,(U, T) = CSM,(B). Clearly Ttl,(U, T), 
and hence by Z-completeness U t-d T( I,( U, T)). By AT-reflection U F I,( U, T). Thus 
O./I < a. Also UFI,,,(U, T), hence by C-completeness, Tkorrl,,@J, T). In other 
words Tl--I,,B+l,(U, T). Ergo c1 < a.(/? + 1). 0 
7.6.9. Theorem. Let CI be in o2 v { co } and let /3 be in o v { co }. Suppose 
O./I < c1 < w.(fl + 1). Then there are RE extensions T and U of PA such that 
L1(U, T) = CSM,(cr) and L,(U, T) = CSM,(j?). 
Proof. Let us write RT for T + {ATA + A(A a sentence of the language of PA}. 
Suppose o.fi d a < o.(p + 1). Let T:= PA + _L,(RPA, PA) and U:= RPA + 
_L,(RPA, PA). By C,-completeness, Tl-Ap,Ao ATA and hence also 
Tl-uRpAA- QA. Also Ut-ATA + A. We find Tl-I,(U, T) and Ul-I,(U, T). By 
AT-reflection it follows that Ul-I&U, T). 
Suppose y < c1 and T I-l,(U, T), then PA!---I,(RPA, PA) + l_,(RPA, PA). Quod 
non. Suppose y < 0.8 and UkI,(U, T), then TI--cI~I,(U, T), i.e. Tt--I,+,(U, T). 
But y + 1 < o.fl< c(. Quod non. 
Let a = o.(/? + 1). Take T:= PA and U:= RPA + I,.,(RPA, PA). By C1-com- 
pleteness U F- oRpA A WO”A. Hence UFI,,,,(U, T). Clearly TFou_L,.,(U, T), so 
Tl-I o.@+ 1). 
We leave it to the reader to verify that for no y < W./I UFI,(U, T) and for no 
6 < o.(p + 1) TFI,(U, T). 0 
7.6.10. Consequence. L1(RPA, PA) = CSM1, L2(RPA, PA) = CSM2. 
7.6.11. An arithmetical completeness result for CSM3. Suppose CSM3 IY@. Then there 
is an interpretation function f* such that N g(4) (f*, RPA, PA). 
Proof. Suppose CSMJ &#J. Consider the model Q constructed in 5.35.8 is of the form 
YsYRG,, where 8, is finite. We have b# [4jf: Clearly N kL = &. Consider h, [ .], ( . ) 
based on 8, RPA and PA. We find Ng L-41, and so by 7.6.4 N$(4). 0 
8. The essentially C-formulas of I$, 
A formula 4 of 2!, is called essentially C w.r.t. T if for all interpretationsf, 4(f, T) is 
provably equivalent in T to a Cl-sentence. 
In this section we want to characterize the essentially C-formula’s of !& w.r.t. PA. 
The first conjecture that comes to mind turns turns out to be correct: such 4 are 
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provably equivalent in L to T or to _L or to a finite disjunction of sentences of the 
form 00. 
How to prove this conjecture? A first idea is to look at those $ in f$, such that 
L ktj -+ q . Perhaps they are precisely the essentially C-formulas w.r.t. PA? This idea 
however does not work. Consider e.g. p A op. Clearly Lb--( p A up) + q (p A up), but 
there is an arithmetical sentence A such that (A A q PAA) is not provably equivalent o 
a ,X,-sentence in PA. (This well-known result is due to Kent [4].) A second idea is to 
use an operator A standing for provability in a theory U which is weaker than PA (e.g. 
PRA) and to consider those $ such that II/ + AtJ is arithmetically valid. This idea does 
not quite work yet: one only gets a characterization of the 4 such that for all 
interpretations f, #~(f, PA) is provably equivalent o a ,X,-sentence in U. The way in 
which the second attempt fails suggests that one should look at a theory or theories 
that is/are in some sense weaker than PA, in some other sense equal to PA. This third 
idea works. I found two ways to implement it. The first one is to use Montagna’s 
interpretation of CSMz plus his uniformized completeness theorem. The 
growing sequence of finite subtheories is as it were in the limit (extensionally) 
equal to PA. A disadvantage of this approach compared with the one elaborated 
below is that the counterexamples it produces tend to be A2 rather than Boole(C,). 
The second way to work out the third idea is to consider the interpretations associated 
with NB1. This way will be pursued here. (Both successful strategies use, in different 
senses, infinitely many interpretations of A; whether this a necessary feature I do not 
know.) 
8.1. Theorem. Suppose C$J E S?,, and 4 is essentially C w.r.t. PA. Then NB1 l-4 -+ Ac$. 
Proof. Let 4 be an essentially C-formula w.r.t. PA of !&. Consider any S E FC 
and any interpretation function 1: Clearly (4)(f, PA) = (4)(f, PA, S). Ex hypothesi 
there is a Ci-sentence A such that pAl-(~#~)(f, PA)+-+ A. It follows that 
PAkA,,,,((4)(f, PA)oA) and hence PAI-A,&+)(f, PA)- Ap,&. Thus 
PAW4)(f, PA, S) --t A 
-, APA,SA 
-+ W)(f, PA, V. 
Thus by the arithmetical completeness theorem for NB1 ~~ -+ A4. 0 
8.2. Fact. Suppose C#I E !&. Then NB11-4 o Lk4. 
Proof. The -z= side is as usual. For the * side note that substituting q for A in NB1 
axioms and rules yields theorems and rules of L. 0 
8.3. Theorem. Suppose 4 E &, and NBi ~~ + AI#I, then L~c$ er Woo. 
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Here W 00 means some disjunction of formulas of the form no. Note that the 
disjunction may be empty, in which case it reduces to I, or one of the CJ may be T, in 
which case the disjunction reduces to T. 
Proof. Let 4 E f$, and suppose NB1 ~~ + A& Clearly 4 can be written in the form 
W fi [cI$, 1 ox, P, 14, where ~6 x E Lo. (Here W M [o$, 1 ox, p, 1 ql means 
a disjunction of conjunctions of formulas of one of the forms: q $, 1 ox, p, 1 q.) 
Consider any disjunct C = fi [oIc/, 1 ox, p, -141. We may assume that 
L h’nc\ oil/ + ox, otherwise C would reduce to _L and could be dropped from our 
disjunction. Similarly we may assume that the p in C and the q in C are disjoint. 
Clearly 
We claim LF h4 q t+h + @I. Suppose not. There is a finite L-model K, = 
((K@, R4), f,) with bottom b, such that b, IV /x\ 09 + 4(&J. Moreover for each of 
the x occurring in C there is a finite L-model K, = ((K,, R,), f,) with bottom b, such 
that b, IY /)c\ 09 + q x(f,). Let p range over 4 and the x in C. Without loss of generality 
we may assume that the K, are pairwise disjoint and do not contain 0. 
We ‘glue’ the K, together to a Carlson-model (and hence a set-model) 6 in the 
following way: 8:= (g,f), where 5 = (K, KO, S) and 
K := (0) u u K,; K,, := u (K,\b,); 
xSy :o (x = 0 and y # 0) or (for some p, x, y E K, and xR,y); 
fpf:= ufppiU{Olpi is a p in C}. 
Clearly if x E K, and 0 E &,, x It- o(f) o x IF o(fJ. b, It q $(f) for each of the $ in 
C. Moreover ORx o (b,Rx for some p). It follows that 0 110$(f). For each x of C 
b, IY ox(f), so there is an x in K,\b, with x lVx(f). Hence for each x in C, 0 lli ox(f). 
Also Oltp(f) for the p in C and OIYq(f) for the q in C. We may conclude 
0 Ik N [o$, 1 ox, p, 1 ql (f). Finally b, IVWI. 
Now consider 6’:= Y&j. Say 8’ = (g’,f’). 8’ is a Carlson-l-model (and hence 
a set-l-model). By 5.22 (0,O) It C(_f’), because C E !&, and no formulas of the form do 
occur in &,. Also (b,, 0) lV$(f’) because $J E 2,). Hence (0,O) IY A4(f’). Contradic- 
tion! 
It follows that LF( W Ao$) -P 4. On the other hand clearly LFc$ + W /XKI$. 
Finally Lt- IX\oll/~na for some g (which may be taken T if the conjunction is 
empty). Hence L t-4 c+ Woo. c] 
8.4. Theorem. Suppose cf~ is in !&,. The following are equivalent: 
(i) 4 is essentially Z w.r.t. PA, 
(ii) NB1 t-4 --f Acj, 
(iii) LFc#I+-+ W no. 
Proof. (i) + (ii) is 8.1; (ii) + (iii) is 8.3; (iii) a(i) is trivial. 0 
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8.5. Kent’s theorem revisited. Clearly if 4 E !& is not essentially 1 w.r.t. PA our 
method should provide us with counterexamples to that effect. Let us by way of 
example show that p A up is not essentially C w.r.t. PA. 
First we show that NBr #(t(p A up) + A ( p A up). This is easily verified by consider- 
ing the following Carlson-l-model: 8 := (({ 1,2}, 8, S),f), where lS2 and fp = { 1). 
To find the desired arithmetical counterexample we must change (5 into a set-2- 
model and embed this into arithmetic. 
Let Q’:= (((0, 1,2}, 8, {1,2}, S’>,j’>, w h ere OSlS2 and f’p = (0, l}. Let 6” be 
YRS’. Clearly 6” is set-Zmodel of the desired sort. Let [ .] be the interpretation 
function associated with NB, PA and 6”. B:= [p] is clearly a counterexample as 
desired. Note thatf”p is downwards closed in (li”, so B is (provably equivalent in PA 
to) a U,-sentence. 
Inspection of the model 6” shows that B itself has the property PA t-B + uPA& but 
B is not provably equivalent in PA to a Cl-sentence. 
8.6. Remark. There are three lines of improvement for our result 8.4. One line is to 
prove analogues for richer modal languages. In fact our result was inspired by 
a question of D. Guaspari, who asked whether the essentially C-formulas of the 
language including operators for witness comparison are precisely the ones that are 
provably equivalent in the logic of Guaspari and Solovay to Boolean combinations of 
boxed formulas and witness comparison formulas (see [3, Question 6.51). This 
question is answered affirmatively in De Jongh and Pianigiani [2]. 
The second line is to extend the result to a wider class of theories. Our proof of 
theorem 8.4 uses the essential reflexiveness of PA. De Jongh and Pianigiani prove 
their result for all C-sound RE extensions of ZC, . The referee points out that the result 
can be even pushed down to PRA. We briefly repeat his argument (in a form only 
understandable for those who have read De Jongh and Pianigiani [2]). The ILM- 
model used by De Jongh and Pianigiani, for the construction of the required inter- 
pretation x is finite and does not contain any non-trivial S-loops. Hence the inter- 
pretations of the modal formulas 4 will be Boole(C,) in PRA. So, by PRA-provable 
U,-conservativity of ZCr over PRA, we find that 4(f, IC,) is PRA-provably equiva- 
lent to &f, PRA). Since, by the construction of f, &(1; ZCr) is not ICr-provably 
equivalent o any C,-formula, a fortiori 4(f, ZCr) is not PRA-provably equivalent o 
any C,-formula, and thus 4(f, PRA) is not PRA-provably equivalent to any C1- 
formula. 
A third line of extension is to ask whether the &-formulas that are essentially of 
some fixed bounded arithmetical complexity are precisely the Boolean combinations 
of boxed formulas. This question is answered affirmatively by Beklemishev [l]. 
8.7. Remark. Let us extend the language &, to !&(C) by adding new propositional 
variables s. An interpretation function for the extended language assigns to the old 
variables p arithmetical sentences and to the new variables s ,X,-sentences. Let 
Lr := L + Fs + OS. It is easily seen that Lz is arithmetically sound and complete 
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(interpreting q as uPA). The argument of this section can be extended to show that the 
essentially C-formulas of 5&,(Z) are precisely those C$ that are provably equivalent in 
LX to formulas of the form W A[s, III)]. 
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